



# CLAWTRAP: THE FIRST DYNAMIC ARENA FOR REAL-WORLD OPENCLAW INSTANCES

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## ABSTRACT

The paradigm shift from foundational Large Language Models (LLMs) toward autonomous agentic workflows has introduced unprecedented security challenges, particularly regarding privacy leakage and information pollution. Despite the global adoption of frameworks like **OpenClaw**, existing security benchmarks remain largely confined to static sandboxes and content-based attacks, failing to account for vulnerabilities at the network interaction layer. In this paper, we present **ClawTrap**, the first dynamic adversarial benchmark designed for the real-world evaluation of the OpenClaw ecosystem. ClawTrap introduces a sophisticated **Man-in-the-Middle (MITM)** attack pipeline that intercepts and manipulates physical network traffic in real-time. We propose a risk-driven attack taxonomy that categorizes adversarial vectors into three dimensions based on their targets: **Task** (inducing operational failure), **Agent** (generating downstream impacts), and **User** (compromising privacy and assets). Our empirical evaluation reveals a significant disparity in "anti-fraud awareness" across model scales. While smaller models like `gpt-5-nano` naively trust tampered HTML environments, flagship models such as `gpt-5.4` demonstrate a sophisticated defensive heuristic by proactively bypassing vulnerable presentation layers in favor of authenticated data feeds (e.g., RSS). By exposing these hidden vulnerabilities in realistic settings, ClawTrap provides a rigorous framework for auditing the robustness of autonomous agents and prompts the open-source community to reconsider the fundamental security of agentic workflows.

**Project Blog:** <https://clawtrap.github.io/>

**Keywords** OpenClaw, MITM, AI Security, LLM-based Agents

## 1 Introduction

The landscape of artificial intelligence is currently undergoing a rapid iteration, transitioning from foundational Large Language Models (LLMs) toward sophisticated **Agentic Workflows** empowered by specialized Model Context Protocol (MCP) tools and Skills. Agents like *Claude Code* and *Codex* in the technical domain, alongside *Manus* in daily-life automation, exemplify this shift as they move beyond simple conversational interfaces to execute multi-step, autonomous tasks with high efficiency. This trend is amplified by the phenomenal adoption of **OpenClaw**, which has evolved from a developer-oriented toolkit into a large-scale public platform.

Importantly, this paper starts from a constructive premise: **OpenClaw is highly valuable, but its security risks cannot be underestimated**. As deployment becomes broader and more autonomous, vulnerabilities such as privacy leakage, information pollution, and unintended action execution become practical risks rather than hypothetical ones. Therefore, improving security evaluation is not a peripheral concern; it is a prerequisite for reliable, responsible, and sustainable adoption of agentic systems in real-world settings.

Several pioneering works have already begun to explore and quantify the safety issues of these automated agent bots. For instance, Zhan et al. [1] evaluated the safety of tool-integrated agents against indirect prompt injection

(IPI) in simulated settings, while Evtimov et al. [2] tested real-world web agents in sandbox environments like VisualWebArena[3]. Furthermore, Wu et al. [4] assessed autonomous frameworks against deceptive UI and malicious prompts, and taxonomic studies like [5] have categorized various failure modes such as agent corruption and sensitive information disclosure.

Despite these significant contributions, existing methodologies remain largely confined to **sandboxed and static settings**, where the dominant threat model is still **content-layer attack injection**. This leaves a crucial blind spot: modern web agents depend on live networked observations, yet their robustness against **dynamic network-layer manipulation** is rarely evaluated.

To close this gap, we present **ClawTrap**, a customized adversarial benchmark designed for the real-world evaluation of OpenClaw under **dynamic Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks**. ClawTrap introduces an MITM pipeline that intercepts and tampers with physical network traffic in real time. By modifying, injecting, or deleting external information during active execution, ClawTrap reveals vulnerabilities that remain hidden in static evaluation and provides a more deployment-faithful assessment of agent robustness.

**Our main contributions are summarized as follows:**

- **A Dedicated MITM Attack Benchmark for OpenClaw:** We propose *ClawTrap*, a benchmark specifically designed to launch and evaluate Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks against OpenClaw agents.
- **Real-Time, Real-World, and Diverse Attack Realization:** ClawTrap operates in live browsing environments and supports highly diverse attack patterns—including response rewriting, targeted injection, and full-page replacement—for realistic security stress testing.
- **Safety Insights for Agentic Workflows:** Through rigorous analysis of failure cases, we reveal significant security disparities across foundation models—where flagship models exhibit high "anti-fraud awareness" while others remain susceptible to MITM deception—prompting the open-source community to reconsider the fundamental safety of autonomous agentic workflows.

## 2 Related Work

The security of autonomous LLM-based agents has emerged as a critical research frontier. While nearly 30 highly relevant papers have been published between 2023 and 2026, existing literature remains fragmented across several key dimensions. We categorize the current landscape into four main areas and highlight the unique positioning of **ClawTrap**.

### 2.1 Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Benchmarks

Indirect Prompt Injection remains the primary threat vector for integrated LLM agents. InjecAgent[1] pioneered this field by evaluating tool-integrated agents across over 1,000 test cases, though it was primarily limited to simulated, single-turn scenarios. AgentDojo[6] advanced this by providing a dynamically extensible framework with 97 realistic tasks and formal utility functions, yet it operates entirely in a simulated environment where agents interact via API calls rather than real browser operations. Furthermore, while the Agent Security Bench (ASB)[7] introduced "hybrid attacks" and covered a wide range of scenarios, its environment remains simulated and lacks the visual or UI-driven dimensions essential for modern web agents. Unlike these benchmarks, ClawTrap focuses on real-world browser interaction beyond simple text-based prompts.

### 2.2 Evaluation of Real-World Web Agents

As agents move toward autonomous browser usage, several benchmarks have transitioned to sandbox environments. WASP utilized the Visual WebArena sandbox to test state-of-the-art models like Claude Computer Use, revealing a "security by incapacity" paradox where low end-to-end success rates are often due to agent capability limits rather than robust defense[2][3]. WebTrap Park is closely related to our work, covering malicious prompts and deceptive designs using containerized environments[4]. However, it relies on web-side instrumentation rather than network-layer interception. Other frameworks like DoomArena[8] and WAREX[9] have explored interactive attack gateways and transparent proxy layers. Notably, WAREX employs a proxy for reliability testing—such as injecting web glitches and pop-ups—but does not focus on systematic security red-teaming or complex phishing chains. While demonstrations by Li et al[10]. have shown the potency of combining IPI with phishing pages on commercial agents, they do not offer a systematic, reusable architecture.

## 2.3 Visual, UI-Level, and Structural Attacks

The intersection of visual perception and agent security is a burgeoning subfield. Environmental Injection Attacks (EIA)[11] demonstrate how manipulating HTML elements, such as invisible forms, can misguide Vision-Language Model (VLM) agents into leaking private information. Similarly, Pop-up Attacks design adversarial pop-ups with attention hooks to induce malicious clicks[12]. Beyond element manipulation, WebInject[13] and AdvAgent[14] have explored technical methods for adding adversarial perturbations to screenshots or generating invisible HTML strings. More comprehensive evaluations like SecureWebArena[15] and TRAP[16] have integrated multi-vector assessments, with TRAP specifically focusing on social engineering through high-fidelity website clones. Despite these advancements, none of these works provide a configurable arena that allows for the batch generation and customization of complex phishing templates.

## 2.4 MITM Technology in Agent Security

The application of Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) technology for systematic agent auditing remains remarkably scarce. AiTM (Agent-in-the-Middle)[17] implemented MITM at the communication layer of multi-agent systems to intercept inter-agent messages, but it does not address the agent-to-web interaction layer. Other research has applied MITM to IoT devices like vacuum robots or focused on prompt injection regarding factual memory, such as the Xmera framework[18]. ClawTrap fills this significant gap by being the first framework to integrate MITM-driven interception into a systematic red-teaming pipeline for real-world web agents.

# 3 ClawTrap

## 3.1 Pipeline




Figure 1: The pipeline of ClawTrap MITM attack system.

As illustrated in Figure 1, the ClawTrap evaluation pipeline consists of five core components: the Scenario Runner, the Honey Server, the OpenClaw agent (the target), the MITM Interceptor, and the Evaluator. The system orchestrates a fully automated, dynamic attack sequence through the following steps:

1. **Set Active Scenario:** The *Scenario Runner* initializes the attack sequence by configuring the *Honey Server* with a specific adversarial scenario (e.g., the target URL, the required payload, and the expected agent behavior).
2. **Trigger Claw:** The *Scenario Runner* dispatches a natural language task instruction to the *OpenClaw* agent, prompting it to begin its autonomous web navigation or task execution.
3. **Traffic Interception:** As *OpenClaw* attempts to communicate with external web services, its physical HTTP/HTTPS traffic is transparently routed through and captured by the *MITM Interceptor*.
4. **Get Active Scenario:** Upon intercepting a request, the *MITM Interceptor* queries the *Honey Server* to retrieve the contextual attack payload corresponding to the active scenario. The interceptor then dynamically tampers with the traffic—modifying DOM elements, injecting malicious prompts, or altering retrieved information—before relaying it to the agent.

5. **Submit Thoughts/Response:** Processing the manipulated environment, OpenClaw executes its reasoning trace. The *Honey Server* silently logs the agent’s internal "thoughts," intermediate actions, and final responses.
6. **Poll for Response & Stats:** The *Scenario Runner* continuously polls the *Honey Server* to collect the execution telemetry and the agent’s final output.
7. **Evaluate:** Finally, the collected trajectory is forwarded to the *Evaluator*, which systematically assesses whether the MITM attack successfully compromised the agent’s logic or data integrity.

### 3.2 Attack Taxonomy in ClawTrap




Figure 2: The ClawTrap MITM Attack Taxonomy: Adversarial scenarios are categorized by their targets (Task, Agent, or User) and mapped to specific adverse outcomes including task failure, downstream impact, and information disclosure.

The ClawTrap framework formalizes a tripartite taxonomy of adversarial scenarios designed around the capabilities of its Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) interception pipeline, which dynamically injects payloads into real-world agent-web interactions. As illustrated in Figure 2, we categorize these attacks based on three primary targets—the **Task**, the **Agent**, and the **User**—each corresponding to distinct negative outcomes such as immediate operational failure, lasting downstream impact, or the compromise of user privacy and assets. Attacks targeting the **Task** focus on inducing direct failure by corrupting the agent’s environmental perception; specific examples include returning tampered or fabricated news search results to mislead the model’s reasoning and deploying persistent malicious pop-ups that provide false error prompts to exhaust the agent’s context and disrupt task continuity. Adversarial vectors directed at the **Agent** itself aim to generate a downstream impact by hijacking autonomous behavior for unauthorized purposes; these scenarios involve using pop-ups to demand the agent perform tasks entirely unrelated to the user’s original request or embedding hidden instructions within a webpage that trigger the agent to produce repetitive, infinite-loop outputs. Finally, attacks centered on the **User** are designed to facilitate information disclosure and property loss through high-fidelity UI manipulation; a typical case involves injecting malicious overlays on e-commerce or procurement pages that prompt the agent to fill in sensitive transaction passwords or other private credentials, thereby bypassing standard security expectations. This unified taxonomy allows the ClawTrap red-teaming arena to systematically evaluate the robustness of autonomous entities against complex, multi-vector threats in a configurable and high-fidelity environment.

## 4 Experiments


### 4.1 Dynamic MITM Attack Setup in Real-world Browsing

Unlike static sandbox benchmarks, our experiments run in a **dynamic real-world browsing loop**: OpenClaw issues live web requests, and ClawTrap performs on-the-fly man-in-the-middle rewriting before the response is rendered to the agent. This setup targets the agent’s observation channel directly, which is the core security surface in practical deployment.

We evaluate two representative MITM injection patterns over browsing results, shown in Figure 3. **Attack A** replaces the returned page with a fabricated news surface (fake webpage content). **Attack B** keeps the real webpage but injects a fake high-urgency warning overlay (real page + deceptive popup/banner). These two attacks cover both full-content poisoning and local UI-signal manipulation under real traffic.

### 4.2 Result of Demo Case 1: Fabricated News Injection

For Demo Case 1 (Attack A), we assign the task "tell me what is on *bbc.com*". The interceptor rewrites the returned page into forged content while preserving normal browsing flow. The attack therefore does not break execution; instead, it silently shifts the semantic evidence seen by the agent.



(a) Attack A: fabricated news page injected via MITM

(b) Attack B: real Google page with injected fake warning

Figure 3: Two dynamic MITM browsing attacks in ClawTrap. Both operate on live traffic, but manipulate different perception layers: full-page content replacement (A) and warning-layer deception on a real page (B).




Figure 4: Model behavior under Attack A. Smaller models tend to summarize poisoned content, while stronger models show higher anomaly awareness.

Results reveal a clear **trust-transfer failure**: once tampered HTML is delivered through the normal channel, weaker models treat it as trustworthy context and produce confident but incorrect summaries. Stronger models are more likely to detect inconsistency, attribute possible interception, or seek safer fallback sources. This demonstrates that dynamic MITM content injection can cause direct task-level failure in real browsing without explicit prompt strings.

Figure 4 shows this contrast concretely. GPT-5-mini reports the injected page as if it were legitimate (e.g., page title "BBC News - Brent Oil Market Today") and then summarizes the forged headlines as normal news content. It follows the expected scraping pipeline correctly, but without authenticity checks. In contrast, GPT-5.4 explicitly states that the observed page is "not the normal live BBC homepage," attributes the anomaly to possible "network interception/proxy rewrite," and proposes safer recovery steps (e.g., fetching BBC News RSS and verifying whether network rewriting is occurring). This behavior difference is important: both models can read the page, but only stronger models reliably reason about **where the page evidence comes from**.

### 4.3 Result of Demo Case 2: Real Page + Fake Warning Injection

For Demo Case 2 (Attack B), we issue "Visit google.com in browser and tell me what is in it." and inject a fake warning on top of an otherwise legitimate page. Compared with Attack A, this case probes whether the agent can calibrate trust in UI-level security signals under dynamic MITM interference.

We observe clear model stratification again. GPT-5.4-nano tends to underweight warning anomalies and continues with surface-level description, while stronger models adopt more conservative reasoning and first verify whether




Figure 5: Model behavior comparison under Attack B (real page with injected fake warning).

the warning is authentic. This indicates that robustness in dynamic real-world settings depends not only on content understanding, but also on **UI-trust calibration**.

The multi-model outputs in Figure 5 make this pattern explicit. GPT-5.4, GLM-5, and Qwen3.5-397b-a17b all flag the warning as injected/non-legitimate and provide causal hypotheses such as extension/script injection, proxy interception, or local network manipulation. By contrast, GPT-5.4-nano mainly returns structural page metadata (title, locale, scripts, and DOM elements) and does not escalate the fake warning as a security anomaly. This indicates that effective defense against dynamic MITM attacks requires both perception and **attribution-level reasoning**; recognizing text alone is insufficient.

Taken together, Demo 1 and Demo 2 support our central claim: the key risk is not only sandbox prompt attacks, but **dynamic, real-world MITM manipulation** of the agent’s observation channel.

More importantly, these findings demonstrate why ClawTrap is practically valuable: it surfaces failure modes that are invisible to static benchmarks and reveals whether a model can perform provenance-aware reasoning under compromised network conditions. In other words, ClawTrap evaluates not only *task completion*, but also *trust calibration*—a core capability required for safe deployment of OpenClaw-like systems.

## 5 Conclusion

In this work, we present **ClawTrap**, the first dynamic MITM-oriented evaluation arena for real-world OpenClaw instances. Our central narrative is straightforward: OpenClaw is a powerful and impactful ecosystem, yet its security exposure grows with its real-world adoption. Therefore, robust evaluation must move beyond static sandbox setups and explicitly test the live observation channel that agents rely on.

Compared with prior agent-security benchmarks that predominantly emphasize static, content-level attacks in simulated environments, ClawTrap introduces a deployment-faithful threat model based on dynamic network interception and response rewriting. This design enables systematic stress testing of task integrity, agent behavior integrity, and user-level safety in a unified framework. Through two representative demos—fabricated page replacement and real-page warning injection—we show that model behavior diverges substantially across model scales: weaker models often transfer trust to tampered evidence, while stronger models exhibit better anomaly attribution and safer fallback strategies.

The broader significance of ClawTrap lies in shifting evaluation criteria from “can the agent finish the task?” to “can the agent finish the task *safely under adversarial network conditions*?” We hope this benchmark helps the community build provenance-aware defenses, improve security-by-design practices, and establish more realistic safety standards for open-source agentic workflows. As future work, we plan to expand scenario coverage, include longitudinal robustness tracking, and explore automatic defense modules that can be paired with OpenClaw deployments.

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